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(Hufstedler, Pregerson ~ 
(DJ), Trask, dis ~entin  
Fe de ral/C iv il 
1. SUMMARY: Petrs challenge a CA ruling that a provision in a 
collective bargaining agreement affording 11 permanent employee .. status 
only upon 45 weeks of employment within a calendar year is not part o f -
a 11 Seniority system .. within the meaning of § 703 (h) of Title VII. 
2o FACTS & DECISIONS BELOW: The seniority arrangement at issue i n 
this case is embodied in a collective bargaining agreement forge d in 
tJ~~~-l 
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negotiations between petr California Brewers Assoco, on behalf of several 
1the 
brewers, and j Teamster Brewers and Soft Drink Workers Joint Board of 
california. The ,agreement establishes five classes of employees: (1) 
new employees7 (2) apprentices7 (3) temporary bottlers7 (4) temporary 
II \~ 
employees (other than bottlers)7 and {5) permanent employees. "Permanent 
employee" status requires 45 weeks of employment within a calendar year 
in the brewing industry in the State of california. Temporary employee 
status requires at least 60 working days within a calendar year, and 
new employees are individuals who do not fall into any of the other 
categories. Apprentices are covered by separate provisions not at issue 
here. 
The above system operates as follows. When a permanent employee 
has been laid off by one employer in the Association, he has a right 
to be dispatched to another Association member and replace the temporary 
or new employee there with the lowest plant seniorjty. Plant seniority 
governs within each class of employees, and dates from the first day ' 
of employment in a seniority tier within the establishment. When senior-
ity of several employees dates from the same date, relative seniority 
is established based upon the length of service in California breweries. 
Resp is a black who in 1968 got his first brewery worker's job in 
california with the Falstaff Brewing Coo and in 1973 he moved over to 
Hamm's. The CA described the situation giving rise to this litigation 
as follows: 
"In 1974 when this action was filed, ~ 6 
years of brewery experience, Bryan·t was still 
- 3 -
classifi~d E ~ t~m orary_ el_!Plo~e because of 
his inability to satisfy the 45-week provision 
in the collective bargaining agreement between 
all ro@jor Calitor.nia E£eweries and brewery 
J nions. o o • On its face the requirement appears 
innocuous. The rub is that changed circumstances 
in the brewery industry, including greater auto-
mation, improved brewing methods, and consoli-
dation of breweries, have lessened the demand 
for labor , so that now it is virtually impossible 
t • ~-- -for ~mporary employee, Black or White, ~o 
work 45 weeKs 1n one ca enda r- year. -
The effect of the 45-week requirement has 
been to deny Bryant and other similarly-situa·ted 
Black brewery worker; t~e opportunity to be 
classified as perma nent employees: no Black has 
ever attained permanent employment s a us 1St. a 
~~~~. ~--~~~--~-----Call orn1a brewery. Pe n App. at 2-3o 
Bryant attacks the 45 week requirement as a violation of Title VII and 
42 u.s.c. § 1981. The DC dismissed the complaint for failure to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
The CA reversed, holding that the 45-week requirement lacked the 
.......... . 
fund arne nta 1 system" within the meaning of 
§ 703(h) of Title VII. That fundamental component is "the concept that 
employment rights should increase as the length of an employee's service 
increases o" App at 9 0 • 
!I 
"In contrast, the brewery industry's 45-week 
requirement does not involve an increase in employ-
ment rights or benefits based upon the length of 
the employee's accumulated service. Under this 
requirement, employees junior in service to the 
employer may acquire greater benefits than senior 
Section 703{h) provides that "it shall not be an unlawful employ -
ment practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensa tior. 
or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employment pursuant to a 
bona fide seniority system, provided that such differences are not the 
result of an intention to discrimination because of race, color, religion, 
sex or national origin •••• " 
- 4 -
employees. Although an employee must work at least 
45 weeks before becoming a permanent employee, 
the acquisition of permanent status may be inde-· 
pendent both of the total time worked and the over-
all length of employment. Some employees could 
( 
acquire permane nt status after only 45-weeks of 
work, if the 45 weeks were served in one calendar 
year. Other employees could work for many_ye~rs 
..___~ 
a d never obtaln ermanent status because they ------- ---were always terminated a few days before completing 
45 weeks of work in any one year. This feature 
distinguishes the challenged system from the 
seniority system considered in Teamsters [Teamsters 
v. United State s, 431 UoS. 324 (1977)]. In 
Teamsters, the use of different measures of sen-
iority for different purposes meant that employees 
might have greater seniority rights for some 
purposes than for others. But employees with 
fewer weeks of service in a particular area 
(company or bargaining unit) could never acquire 
greater benefits within that area than employees 
with longer service there. Under the 45-week re-
quirement, less senior employees could acquire 
greater rights regardless of whether one measures 
seniority by length of employment in a bargaining 
unit, plant, company, or industry." APPo at 9-10. 
Since the 45-week requirement was "not part of a seniority system," 
\ rasp was not required to prove any form of intentional discrimination 
I to make out a Title VII violation. It reversed the DC's judgment and 
rema~ded so that resp could prove that the 45-week provision had a 
discriminatory impact. Also the DC was to consider resp's 42 u.s.c. 
§ 198l~nd 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(a), 185(a) claims. 
~udge Trask dissented, concluding that under Teamsters resp could 
not make out a claim and that the DC had properly dismissed the action. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Petrs first suggest that there is a conflict with 
v 
theCA 6's opinion in Alexander v. Machinists, Aero I,odge No. 735, 565 
F.2d 1364 (1977). There a particular system of "job equity" was at issue: 
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an absolute preference in filling a vacancy to employees with prior, 
satisfactory service in a particular occupation, even though other worker. 
may have more plant-wide seniority. Petr perceives a conflict in the 
CA 9's failure to recognize the diversity of seniority systems that 
come within§ 703{h) under Teamsters. Moreover, theCA 9 here has 
effectively barred the parties from ever developing a factual record 
regarding the role of the 45-week rule within the brewery seniority 
system, despite the admissions of all parties that the requirement was 
part of the seniority system; Petrs contend that at the very least this 
case should be remanded for reconsideration in light of Teamsterso 
Petrs call particular attention to footnote 41 of this court's 
Teamsters decision. 
"There is no reason to suppose that congress 
intended in 1964 to extend less protection to 
legitimate departmental seniority systems than 
to plant-\'lide seniority systems. Then, as now, 
seniority was measured in a number of ways, 
including length of time with the employer, in 
a particular plant , in a department in a job or 
in a line of proqression. The legislative 
history contains no suggestion that any one 
system was preferred." Teamsters Vo United 
States, 431 u.s. 324, 355 n. 41. 
They contend that the 45-week provision is virtually indistinguishable 
from numerous seniority devices commonly employed in American industry. 
Probation periods like the 45-week rule are quite common. "Businesses, 
with seasonal changes, such as department stores or delivery companies, 
often provide that seniority cannot be accumulated during those periods 
when the work force swells due to part-time or seasonal hires." Petn 
at 14. 
- 6 -
A response has been filedo Resp characterizes the 45-week rule 
as merely a classification device that determines who enters the permanen 
employee seniority line. This function does not make it part of the 
seniority system. Otherwise any classification device, such as the 
requirement that an applicant have an academic degree, would be con-
sidered part of the seniority system. TheCA 6's Alexander opinion 
simply addressed a system where "job seniority" took preference over 
"plant seniority" under certain circumstanceso Resp suggests that the 
45-week rule is peculiar to the brewery industry in californi~ and does 
not present a significant issue requiring decision by this courto 
4.• DISCUSSION: The CA 9 has here adopted a rigid notion of the 
proper components of a seniority system that is arguably not consonant 
with this Court's Teamsters decisiono The 45-week requirement is neutral 
on its face and not so illogical that one can conclude, without taking 
any evidence, that it has no place in a bona fide seniority system. 
It seems that in any increasingly automated industry any seniority system 
will perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. There is nothing 
particularly invidious about the 45-week requiremento The CA majority 
appeared influenced by the argument that the 45-week rule was particu-
larly susceptible to abuse, "since employers and unions can manipulate 
their manpower requirements and employment patterns to prevent indi-
viduals who are disfavored from ever achieving permanent status. Because 
/ 
seniority rights under a true seniority system usually accumulate auto-
matically over time, it is difficult to manipulate them in a discriminator~ 
- 7 -
mannero" Petn at llo But that inquiry does not appear to go prope rly 
to the que stion whe ther the 45-week rule is part of a bona fide seniority 
system. Rathe r the relevant question would be the operational rationale 
for the seniority pla n or any purported part of it. If a provision is 
under 
part of a bona fide seniority system,/§ 703(h) any discriminatory im~act 
------------~----------~-------------~- ' 
violates Title VII only if coupled with discriminatory intento Despite 
the interlocutory posture of the proceedings below, I think the question 
here is substantial and if the Court is inclined to explicate its 
Teamsters holding, this is a manageable opportunity to do so. 
There is a responseo 
5/23/79 
CMS 
Haar CA op in petn. 
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The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- er 11/20/79 
BENCH MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: Ellen 
DATE: November 20, 1979 
RE: No. 78-1546 California Brewers Association v. Bryant 
The basic issue is whether the 45-week rule for obtaining 
"permanent employee" status under the collective bargaining 
agreement is protected by Section 703(h) of Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, immunizing the use of "bona fide" seniority 
systems to the extent they are free from intentional 
discrimination. For analytical purposes, the parties have broken 
the issue into three parts: 
1. Is the 45-week rule protected as an "integral part" 
of a seniority system? 
2. Is the 4 5-week rule protected as a seniority system 
in and of itself? 
3. Can either issue be decided on the present factual 
record, which includes the terms of the contract but contains no 




I. Authority and governing principles 
The underlying problem is that neither the statute, the 11...£> 
legislative history, nor this Court's precedents provide any kind ~ 
of definition of "seniority system." Resp Bryant and several~ 
the amici have proposed definitions, none of which is parti~~~ 
successful. The authority cited by the parties is distinctly 
unhelpful. Nothing in the cited courts of appeals decisions has 
much persuasive force either way. Nor does the analogy to this 
Court's cases under the Military Selective Service Act add to the 
analysis. The issue arises in those cases in such a different 
context that the cited discussions can be read to mean almost 
anything, as the parties have demonstrated (although I find the 
SG's reading of these cases grievously misleading). At best, they 
show only that the Court has recognized the wide variety of devices 
appropriate for incorporation in a seniority system. Finally, 
reference to general principles of statutory construction in this 
area are not enlightening. Resp contends that exceptions to 
remedial legislation like Title VII should be construed narrowly. 
Petr replies that the national labor policy favors allowing 
flexibility to employers and unions to design appropriate seniority 
systems. Neither point is much more than a makeweight. 
I believe the starting_ point for analysis should be two 
sic principles as to which there is really no dispute: ( i) 
~ the core component of a seniority system is some criterion 
based on length of service; and (ii) fco~ a seniority system 
incorporates rules not based on that criterion, including at a 
3. 
minimum those that define the units in which seniority will accrue 
and the methods for computing its accrual, loss, and reinstatement. 
Further elaboration of point (i) leads into a morass. I 
do not believe that the core concept 
SG would have us believe; that is, 
require that benefits be awarded on 
is as narrow as resp and the 
that seniority systems must 
a graduated scale based on 
increments in cumulative length of service in whatever unit the 
employer and union deem relevant. In fact, footnotes in both the 
SG' s and resp' s brief belie their ostensible adherence to this 
narrow principle, as petr's reply brief points out. The SG admits 
that a seniority system may give "reasonable recognition to 
continuity of satisfactory service." (36) And resp admits that 
seasonal businesses may require some system that creates a pool of 
trained and available temporary employees who do not receive the 
same benefits as full-time employees. 
Although I am fairly certain that the "core" principle 
proposed by resp and the SG is too narrow, I am not certain what to 
replace it with. This will be a very difficult case to write in a 
way that gives some guidance without establishing broad dicta that 
may lead to unintended results. I would need to give it a great 
deal more thought before proposing any standard. But the parties 
have correctly identified some general considerations that should 
inform the result. 
Resp is correct in insisting that every seniority system 
must result in an "ordinal ranking of employees" based on an 
"o~jective, non-manipulable standard," and that that standard must 
4. 
be based in some sense on length of service. At the least, this 
"seniority principle" means that incumbents are advantaged, and 
that certain job benefits are obtained simply by working, without ~ 
regard to evaluations or discretionary judgments by employers. In 
protecting systems based on these principles, Congress intended to 
protect the legitimate expectations of incumbent employees. 
Although the benefits accruing under the system need not be 
"automatic," they must be "reasonably certain" of attainment with 
the passage of time in service to the employer. Resp's contention 
that the system should not be subject to manipulation is somewhat 
more questionable - as one of the amici points out, the problem of 
manipulation of the system goes more to its bona fides than to its ~ 
qualification as a seniority system in the first instance. I would 
thus not require that the system be completely free from potential 
for manipulation. But the concept of seniority does include some 
notion that benefits are not subject to employer or union whim, and 
this factor is relevant in identifying "true" seniority systems. 
Turning to point (ii), there is agreement among the 
parties that the seniority system must include a large number of 
ancillary rules not based directly on the "core concept" defined by 
point (i), including those which define units and events triggering 
losses or reinstatement s of seniority. Moreover, the parties 
agree that certain rules should never be deemed part of the system: 
For example, criteria for promotion based on performance 
evaluation, tests, height and weight standards, and so on. No one 
has suggested a principled way to draw the line between these two 
5. 
sets of rules, and the parties disagree as to several intermediate 
cases, principally probationary periods, "superseniority" for union 
officials, and of course this case. 
~ suggests a "realistic" approach in which the system']?~ 
is scrutinized "as an integrated whole" and compared to known~-
 
patterns of seniority prevailing elsewhere in industry. Resp would~
simply draw the line at definitions of units and me thOds for ~· 
gaining and losing seniority - a superficially attractive solution~ 
but not one that accords with generally accepted notions of what is 
'5 S (f / and is not part of the system. 
~~His disappointing brief suggests that cumulative length of service 
I'm not sure what the SG would do. 
h must be the key, but goes on to recognize that seniority may be 
allocated on some sort of stage or step system (thus perhaps 
endorsing probationary periods) and that continuity may be a factor 
if it is reasonable. The footnotes and hypotheticals in the SG's 
brief strongly evoke the dangers the courts are running in this 
area, that is, finding themselves evaluating the reasonableness of 
particular clauses without any criteria to guide them. I would 
agree with petr that if such a task is to be undertaken, it should 
only be under the substantive guidance of Title VII - that 
is, we I 
should acknowledge that the clauses are part of the system and then 
ask whether they are intentionally discriminatory. 
The Court may not need to resolve this intractable 
problem in this case, because the rule at issue here does not seem 
all that There really is no "mix" of discretionary 





the system as resting on fortuities and possible manipulations. I 
think the case may be resolved, as resp proposes, principally by 
reference to the "core principle" that seniority accrues according 
to time worked. 
II. The 45 week rule 
Resp and the SG propose a number of hypotheticals 
designed to show that the 45 week rule has no foundation in "time 
served." I think petr has rather convincingly shown that this is 
wrong - because of the seniority basis for work assignments, it 
must certainly be true that the more senior temporaries have a 
better chance of achieving permanent status than their juniors. 
The fact that economic setbacks of particular employers and illness 
or vacation by particular employees may result in inconsistencies 
in the ordinary scenario does not detract from this conclusion. 
Every seniority system is subject to those fortuities, particularly 
~ 
when it is a combination of plant and industry seniority. And the 
contention that employers (or the union itself) may use the system 
to manipulate on racial grounds is absolute speculation. I see no 
greater potential for manipulation here than in any "hiring hall" 
system in which employees are dispatched by the union according to 
seniority and accepted or rejected by the employer subject to a fee 
for "show-up time." Yet surely no one would contend that such a 
system was not based on seniority. 
It may also be noteworthy that the 45 week rule is in a 
section of the contract dealing directly with seniority, and that 
7. 
the definition of "temporary" and "permanent" employees are 
explicitly stated to be for purposes of seniority only. Resp is 
probably correct in asserting that the 45 week rule by itself is 
not a seniority system. It is only when it is placed in the 
context of the entire system, particularly the seniority rules for 
dispatching employees to work assignments and the role of plant 
seniority in determining layoffs and bumping, that its real basis 
in the "time served" concept becomes clear. Although there is no 
graduated scale of benefits according to increments of time served 
in the usual sense, there is increasing likelihood of attaining a 
single benefit as time goes by. The common understanding that all 
of this is part of the normal operation of this rather complex 
seniority system is illustrated by resp's original position 
couching his complaint explicitly in terms of a challenge to the 
"seniority system" and his adherence to that position right up to 
the decision in Teamsters. 
The fact that adverse economic conditions have resulted 
in stagnation for all temporary employees in recent years should 
not change the result (just as in the last-hired first-fired cases 
such as Teamsters). Indeed, as amicus EEAC points out, resp's 
theory of relief itself is premised on the classic problem with 
seniority systems from the point of view of minorities - that is, 
that they tend to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination by 
favoring those employees who have been in the business the longest. 
I am not sure that that principle can be elevated into a test for 
determining ;~hether a particular rule is one of seniority or not. 
8. 
But it is rather telling that resp alleges no present 
discrimination. His only complaint is that a facially neutral 
system combined with an economic downturn have "locked him in" to 
the subordinate role resulting from past discrimination. 
Ultimately either conditions will change or permanent employees 
will leave the ranks to such an extent that "promotions" to that 
status will again be necessary and the system will resume normal 
operation. All of this is symptomatic of the real ill resp 
challenges - that is, the seniority principle itself. 
III. Conclusion 
The factual analysis in Part II suggests that the Court 
need wrestle with the theoretical problems discussed in Part I only 
to a limited extent. It will be necessary to outline principles or 
come up with a test defining to some extent the "core concept" of a 
seniority system, but it should not be necessary to wrestle with ______., 
the problem of the incorporation of "non-seniority based" rules in 
that system. I would conclude that the 45 week rule is not by 
huf 
itself a seniority s stem. ~When viewed in the context of the other 
seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, 
however, it clearly derives from and operates to further the 
principle that benefits are to be allocated on the basis of time 
served. The case does not raise the difficult problem of "mixed" 
rules looking to both sen~iori ty and other factors in allocating 
benefits. It is instead a "pure" seniority case, like those 
involving unit definitions or plant and department seniority. 
9. 
Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and 
remand for further proceedings in which resp will have the 
opportunity to prove intentional discrimination. 
Although I believe this decision can be reached on the j 
~ 
present record, it would also be defensible to contend that the
factual conclusions reached as to the likelihood of attaining ~ 
1-o 
permanent status at different levels of seniority are speculative.~
This position would require the Court to remand for additional~ 
findings as to the actual operation of the system. Before the~. 
economic downturn, did the more senior temporaries in general 
achieve permanent status before their juniors? Even now, are more 
senior temporaries likelier overall to accumulate more work time in 
a given year than juniors? If a record could be built 
demonstrating these facts, the case would of course be stronger. 
And since the case will have to be remanded anyway, this course 
might be the safer one. 
November 20, 1979 
78-1548 Calif. Srewers v. Bryant 
Dear Chief: 
It has iust come to my attention that I am "out" of 
the above case. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Mr. Michael Rodak, Jr. 
There are a substantial number of parties in this case. When 
I commenced work on the briefs for the first time I 
discovered that Miller Brewinq Company, a subsidiary of 
Philip Morris, is a party. I therefore will not participate 





.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
~u:prtnu <!Jltttrl o-f f:lr.t 'Jtnit.t~ ~mt.ts 
:Jiraglfhtghm, ~. <lJ. 2!T~J!.~ 
January 7, 1980 
Re: 78-1548 - California Brewers Association 
v. Bryant 
Dear Potter: 
Please show that I took no part in the consideration 
or decision of this case. 
Respectfully, 
JL 
Mr. Justice Stewart 







Brewers v. Bryant 
I 
Please show on the next draft of your opinion 
took no part in the consideration or decision of this 
Sincerely, 
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